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Abstract
A rigorous language for discussing the issue of configuration management is currently lacking. To
this end, we develop a simple state machine model of configuration management. Observed behaviors
comprise the state of a host and configuration processes accomplish state transitions. Using this
language, we show that for one host in isolation and for some configuration processes, reproducibility
of observed effect for a configuration process is a statically verifiable property of the process. Using
configuration processes verified in this manner, we can efficiently identify latent preconditions that
affect behavior among a population of hosts. Constructing configuration management tools with
statically verifiable observed behaviors thus reduces the lifecycle cost of configuration management.
© 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
System configuration management is the ongoing process of maintaining the usability
of computer systems and networks, and assuring that each system or network serves the
missions of the human organizations that utilize it. The system administrator oversees
and takes part in this process in a variety of ways, by performing manual configuration
changes on one computing system at a time, or perhaps by invoking computer programs
that accomplish similar changes for a single system or the network as a whole.
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At the lowest level, configuration management controls the behavior of computer
systems by specifying and controlling the contents of files stored in some form of non-
volatile storage such as disk or flash memory. These files specify in detail how each
host should behave, and may include computer programs that provide or prevent specific
behaviors. These files are called configuration files and are referred to collectively as the
configuration of the system. Their contents are not controlled by regular users and do not
change due to actions of non-administrators. Configuration management is the process of
specifying, modifying, and otherwise managing the contents of these configuration files.
Configuration management can often be described by specifying a set of configuration
operations, where each operation is an atomic modification of one or more configuration
files. A configuration management strategy consists of a set of configuration operations
along with a set of guidelines describing when and how to apply each operation to achieve
a desirable effect. Each operation can be automated or manual. An automated operation
is equivalent to the program that automates it, while a manual operation is a documented
procedure that a human might carry out to implement the operation.
Configuration management is the process of coordinating the behavior of sets or
“communities” of machines; it has little benefit for one host in isolation. The overall goal of
any configuration management strategy is economy of scale: the ability to repeat processes
on a subset of machines with precisely the same effect on each machine’s behavior. It
is thus problematic for the same operation—applied to a population of hosts—to have
inconsistent effects when applied to hosts within the population.
One cause of potential problems is heterogeneity: variations in architecture
or configuration among populations of machines. While a heterogeneous network
traditionally refers to a set of machines that vary in architecture (e.g. SPARC versus i86),
heterogeneity appears in many other and more subtle ways. Due to automatic substitutions
during modern manufacturing, internal hardware configurations of systems commonly
vary even within populations of the same exact make and model of machine. Within a
population of supposedly identical machines, one may discover differing brands of disk
drives, networking cards, etc. Machines can also be customized by adding both hardware
and software.
Like any software program, every configuration management operation—whether
automated or manual—requires some pre-existing conditions to assure an appropriate
behavioral result for the operation. A host requirement necessary to assure a desired effect
for an operation is called a precondition of the operation. Due to software and hardware
heterogeneity, often an individual system possesses a software or hardware property whose
presence cannot be easily detected except through failure of the system as a result of a
configuration change. A latent precondition of an operation is one that is not known by
the administrator beforehand, but whose absence causes a behavioral problem after the
operation is applied, for some subset of hosts within a population.
For example, in a recent version of Linux, activating two network cards of the same
exact make and model on the same host led to a serious networking problem, in which
some packets were forwarded out of an incorrect interface. If only one card was active, no
problems were encountered. The existence of a second identical network card in the host
chassis violated a latent precondition whose detrimental effects would only be exposed
when one attempted to enable and use the second card. This precondition was exposed
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only when an administrator tried to connect the system to two independent networks. This
is only one example of many kinds of latent preconditions [22] that can be present in both
software and hardware.
There are several kinds of latent preconditions, including those related to software bugs,
hardware configuration, environmental factors, and even configuration strategy. The Linux
precondition described above is a driver bug, but also a precondition involving hardware
state. An environmental precondition concerns factors outside the current host, e.g., being
protected or not protected by a UPS system, or having particular kinds of services available
on a network of a host to be configured. Some preconditions are artifacts of configuration
management itself, e.g., the presence or absence of a particular configuration management
tool or file.
Latent preconditions are only meaningful in the context of a set of operations to be
applied and a set of hosts to be configured. If a set of hosts possesses a latent precondition
only for a certain set of configuration operations, and these operations are never used, the
precondition is not latent in that case. For example, if there is no configuration operation
that ever enables two network cards on the same host, then the above precondition of
installing only one network card from each vendor is not latent for that set of operations.
One strategy for avoiding latent preconditions is thus to limit the set of operations that one
can apply to a host.
The goal of any configuration management strategy is to achieve reproducibility of
effect. Each operation, applied to a host in a particular state, should have the exact same
effect upon the host’s behavior regardless of the particular identity of the host within
the network. Configuration operations should cause deterministic state transitions from
one behavioral state to another. If we understand the complete state of a host, and base
all configuration changes on that state, it would seem that any reasonable configuration
operation (that completes or halts) is reproducible.
However, there is a very subtle quandary that prevents many operations from being
reproducible. There is a marked difference between the actual and complete state of a host,
and that part of the state that humans and operations can practically observe as being part
of the state. In making a configuration change, it is not practical to examine the whole
state of the hard disk beforehand. Much of the actual state of a host is not observed.
Latent preconditions arise in parts of host state that humans or operations are not currently
considering when making changes.
2. Overview
In this paper, we develop a new model of configuration management and discuss some
of its implications.
Prior models of configuration management (as embodied by existing configuration
management tools and practices) presume the correctness of the system documentation,
and concentrate upon producing low-level configurations that should have particular
behavioral effects according to the documentation. This low-level process requires ongoing
consistency checking and conflict resolution, but does not consider the behavior of the
configured system.
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In contrast to this prior work, our model defines configuration management as a high-
level process that assures particular behaviors. The documentation is treated not as a
set of axioms, but as a set of hypotheses; explicit testing [39] determines whether the
documentation is correct. We carefully define behavior as that which we choose to observe.
That which is observed is not all that is potentially observable. We carefully avoid the use
of the word “observable”, which denotes the potential to observe rather than the ongoing
process of observing. This model requires many definitions and has several important
subtleties, discussed in the following sections.
In Section 3, we show how to view configuration management as a state machine,
where states are behaviors and transitions are configuration operations. Because behavior
is only partially observed, this state machine can be non-deterministic, even though
the underlying configuration operations are deterministic. Assuring determinism of the
underlying state machine requires two steps: enforcing predictable behavior for a single
machine in isolation, and coping with heterogeneity in a population of machines. An
operation is locally reproducible if it always has a predictable effect upon one machine
in isolation, and population reproducible if it has a predictable effect for any machine in a
population.
In Section 4, we study local reproducibility of behavioral effects of configuration
operations. In Theorem 1, we demonstrate that local reproducibility is a statically verifiable
property of the program code for some kinds of configuration operations. In existing
configuration management tools, one can never be sure whether a configuration problem
is the fault of the software making the configuration change or of a latent precondition
of the configured system. Theorem 1 allows us to utilize provably locally reproducible
operations to change one’s configuration, so that behavioral variation after configuration
always indicates a latent precondition on the host rather than in the code.
In Section 5, we exploit locally reproducible configuration operations to identify latent
variation among populations of machines. In Theorem 2, we demonstrate that population
reproducibility is synthetically constructible by adding synthetic observed states that
distinguish between subsets of machines for which operations differ in effect. A locally
reproducible configuration operation whose effect exposes a latent precondition is a
sufficient test for the presence of the precondition. Thus—without knowledge of the
exact nature of latent preconditions—we can construct equivalence classes of hosts
with observably equivalent latent preconditions. To assure appropriate response of an
equivalence class, one must test an operation on one representative of the class. Thus
the whole network can be viewed as a deterministic state machine, where transitions are
configuration operations applied to subsets of hosts.
In Section 6, we relate this model to current practices and tools for configuration man-
agement. So-called “best practices” that assure reliable and predictable responses to con-
figuration changes can be viewed as limiting one’s practice so that the configuration state
machine becomes deterministic and operations have reproducible effects. This is accom-
plished either by eliminating latent preconditions, limiting allowed operations, or both.
In Section 7, we examine the long-term implications of this model. So far,
administrators have been faced with the problem of identifying latent preconditions
themselves, without any help from their tools. Our model will allow one to build
configuration management tools that not only efficiently identify preconditions, but for
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which the efficiency of identifying latent effects improves with scale of application.
Similarly, the observed algebraic properties of configuration operations can be used to
infer emergent properties of evolving communities of systems.
3. A model of configuration management
In defining the notion of configuration, we avoid making distinctions that might
cloud our reasoning. We do not make a distinction between “machine” (in the algebraic
sense) and “configuration”. A machine c is indistinguishable from its configuration, just
as a Turing machine can be considered as indistinguishable from its program. Every
configuration c is an attribute of some host h(c) (that some would call a system or
architecture or platform) that represents the underlying hardware invariants of the system,
e.g., the components it contains and perhaps its physical location in a building. We build
networks from hosts, but at any given time each host embodies a configuration created
through configuration management. Likewise, each host h has the ability to embody a finite
(but very large) set of distinct configurationsD(h), of which c ∈ D(h) is one example.
For now, we limit our discussion to persistent properties of the host being configured:
Axiom 1. At any particular time, a host h has exactly one configuration (actual state)
c ∈ D(h), that only changes as the result of configuration operations.
Thus the “configuration” is that invariant part of a system that is not modified during
normal operation or by normal users who are not also administrators. By contrast,
cfengine’s concept of “configuration” [7,8,12] includes management of user-controlled
features such as processes and user files. We consider the latter kind of management as
“resource management” rather than “configuration management”. While it is relatively
simple to model out-of-band (or unauthorized) changes to configuration, it would
unnecessarily complicate and obfuscate our current argument, so it is left for future work.
As another simplifying assumption,
Axiom 2. The behavior of a host is completely determined by its configuration.
This is not so much an axiom as a definition of the kind of “behavior” that we will consider
in studying configuration management. In configuration management, behavior is a static
property of a system. This differs from the definition in resource management, in which it
is a dynamic property.
There are two forces that control the behavior of any host: its configuration and
availability of appropriate resources. Likewise, there are two ways any host can fail: by
errors in configuration, or by lack of resources. Clearly, hosts can fail to function properly
when a user does something to compromise the host’s resources, e.g., filling up a disk or
executing enough processes to fill the process table. Controlling the configuration is the
job of configuration management, while controlling available resources is the separate (but
equally important) job of resource management. As there are many tools that serve both
functions, these two tasks have lately (incorrectly) come to be considered as inseparable.
From the standpoint of configuration management, a host is configured correctly if
it behaves correctly whenever it possesses appropriate resources to do so. We presume
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that some resource management mechanism handles this, separate from configuration
management. For example, the configuration of a web server is correct even if some user
web program goes into infinite loops, thus locking up the server. This behavior is not part
of configuration.
In the following, we make the tacit assumption that appropriate resources are present
to allow measurement of behavior, and that these resources have been assured by some
separate process of resource management.
3.1. Observed tests
We next must define what we mean by “observed behavior”. This requires identifying
the questions we might ask in determining whether a particular behavior is present.
Suppose that we are given a finite set of tests T that we can apply to a configuration.
Tests are questions that can be answered with “yes” or “no” by some undisclosed method.
Tests might include such questions as:
• Does the system have a 5 GB hard drive?
• Does the system have at least 128 MB of RAM?
• Does the system have a network card?
• Is port 69 listed in /etc/services?
• Does TCP port 80 answer web service requests?
• Does UDP port 69 reject tftp requests?
Some of these questions concern hardware configuration, while others concern behavior,
both internal and external. Each numeric measurement is represented by a set of questions,
one per possible value. Also,
Axiom 3. The value of each observed test is a function of actual configuration.
Tests are chosen to represent static properties of configuration, not resource bounds, and
presume the presence of adequate resources for performing the test. For a particular
configuration c to which a test t applies, we denote the answer to the question t ∈ T
as t (c); this is an integer 1 or 0, where 1 means “yes” and 0 means “no”.
As the goal of our work is completely automatic configuration management, all tests
in T are to be performed automatically. There are actually several kinds of information
whose interplay determines the effectiveness of configuration management, including the
tests it is possible to perform automatically (“observable behaviors” U), the tests one elects
to perform automatically (“observed behaviors” T ), tests that it is possible for a human to
perform manually (“requirements” of a system R) and tests a human elects to perform
to assure requirements (“validation” of requirements V). Clearly T ⊂ U , V ⊂ R, and
T ∩ V = φ.
If T = V , a human is not required in order to validate a system, but this is almost never
the case. In particular, there is no common and standardized scheme for automatically test-
ing the function of graphical user interfaces to programs. Usually, we must be content with
automatically measuring some subset of behaviors, leaving a full validation of system func-
tion for human testing later. This root problem can only be solved by changing the nature
of application programming so that manual testing procedures can always be automated.
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Until this happens, our tests T are those it is possible to perform automatically, and by
nature only partially validate a system’s behavior, especially if that system provides inter-
active services to users. Even if a system passes all tests in T appropriately, there may be
tests in V whose outcome it is impossible to discern solely from tests in T .
We carefully refer to tests as “observed” and avoid referring to them as “observable”.
The tests T that are actually observed are usually a small subset of the tests U that are
potentially observable. In most existing configuration management strategies, observed
tests concern properties only of the configuration itself, not its behavior (see Section 6 for
more details).
Each test t ∈ T corresponds to an observed behavior of the configuration. The
collection of responses corresponding to all tests is an observed state:
Definition 1. For a configuration c and a set of tests T , an observed state of c is a mapping
ψc : T → {1, 0} that gives the answers to all questions at a particular time, where
ψc(t) = t (c) is the answer to question t ∈ T for the configuration c. Since ψc is the
result of applying all tests in T , we also write ψc = T (c).
Each answer is a numeric value: 1 for true and 0 for false, consistent with boolean
expressions in C and C++; it will be convenient to utilize C expressions for many questions.
For example, “X == 3” is the question as to whether the test parameter X has the value 3
or not, which is 1 if true and 0 if false. The possible observed states of a configuration are
a non-comprehensive, finite set of 2|T | alternatives, where |T | is the number of tests in T .
Behaviors not described by tests in T are deemed to be unobserved.
We make this distinction between observed and unobserved behaviors to correct
a common misconception. It is commonly believed that one can reliably make a
configuration c behave “like” some given ideal configuration i through, e.g., cloning.
This task, while seemingly reasonable, is often under-specified. What does “like” mean?
Obviously, the clone cannot have the same IP address, and it might not even be comprised
of the same kinds of hardware components. We presume when cloning a configuration from
another that the person who wrote the cloning software chose an appropriate definition
of “like”. Without knowledge of that definition, we cannot test whether the definition
is appropriate or not. To avoid such vagueness, we demand that the tests of likeness be
explicit. Two configurations c and d are “like one another” whenever t (c) is identical to
t (d) for every test t ∈ T , i.e., when T (c) = T (d) as functions.
We specifically avoid imposing structure on T , other than thinking of it as a “list of
yes/no questions”. Obviously, tests form a hierarchy that echoes the hierarchy of subsys-
tems to which they apply. We argue that this structure, while naturally present, mainly
serves as a representation or data compression mechanism for the tests. An -bit integer
measurement corresponds to 2 questions, one per possible value; we can represent the an-
swers to all of these questions by storing  bits. A well-designed subsystem corresponds to
a subset of related tests that are either “all true” or “all false”, so that there is one answer to
all questions for the whole subsystem, and in most cases, only that one answer needs to be
recorded to represent the state of the subsystem. Many sets of test parameters exhibit a class
structure that can be efficiently represented by applying environmental acquisition [42] or
value inheritance [17,33,34]. In both cases, some parameter values are declared to be func-
tionally dependent upon others rather than being explicitly stated. Similarly, the answers
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to some questions are functionally dependent upon the answers to others; one must have a
web server running in order to serve particular content. We argue that these issues are mat-
ters of representation, rather than semantics, and can be omitted from discussion except
as forms of data compression for the test results. This greatly simplifies discussion of our
abstract model, and allows us to avoid logical pitfalls that were previously obscured by the
complexity of the configuration management process.
3.2. Configuration operations
Next we need to understand the properties of configuration operations.
Definition 2. A configuration operation p takes as input a configuration c and produces a
modified configuration c′ = p(c).
An operation p acts on a configuration c to produce a new configuration c′ for the same host
(so that h(c) always equals h(c′)). An operation can be automated or manual, accomplished
by a computer program or by a human administrator. Operations can be combined through
function composition:
Definition 3. For two operations p and q , the operation q ◦ p is defined as applying p,
then q , to c: q ◦ p(c) = q(p(c)).
In this paper, sequences of operations are read from right to left, not left to right, to conform
to conventions of algebra.
We make no mathematical distinction between a configuration and the series of
operations utilized to create it. If operations p1, p2, and p3 are applied to a baseline (or
initial) configuration b, we think of p3 ◦ p2 ◦ p1(b) = p3(p2(p1(b))) as the configuration
resulting from applying p1, p2, and p3 to b, in that order. In the same way, the baseline
configuration b is equivalent to and interchangeable with a recipe for building that initial
configuration. Thus we may unambiguously write p3 ◦ p2 ◦ p1 ◦ b to describe the result of
all four processes.
As with tests, we carefully make no initial assumptions about the structure of
configuration operations. An operation whose effect varies with values of arguments is
considered to be a set of separate operations, one per possible argument value. For example,
setting the limit for the number of concurrent web servers to one, two, or more requires one
distinct operation per value. In practice, this large set of distinct operations is represented
by a single parametrized operation that sets a configuration parameter to a given value.
We avoid making this representation part of our model—in like manner to the way we treat
parametrized tests—to avoid misconceptions in reasoning brought about by the complexity
of representation rather than the complexity of the actual operations.
These definitions are easy to generalize to sets of hosts H. Given a host h ∈ H,
the operations appropriate to that host map actual configurations to others. If D(h)
represents the configurations that can be embodied within a host, then a configuration
operation p : D → D, transforms an actual configuration c ∈ D to a new configuration
c′ = p(c) ∈ D. For an operation p applied to a heterogeneous set of hosts H, D must
contain the configurations of all kinds of hosts to which p applies, i.e., D = ⋃i Di , one i
per host type. In this case, we also know that for any reasonable p, p : Di → Di for each i .
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3.3. Configuration automatons
If T is a set of n = |T | tests, with two possible outcomes “yes” and “no” for each
test, there are 2n possible outcomes of all tests considered as a group. Let Ψ = Ψ (T )
be the set of possible states of the tests, i.e., the set of all 2n functions ψ that describe
mathematically possible observed states. Let h be any host to which the states apply. Then
any set of configuration operations P applicable to the host h defines a (possibly non-
deterministic) finite automaton (Ψ ,P,W) having the states Ψ and inputs P , where W is
a set of transition rules depending upon the behaviors of h and defined as follows. For a
state ψ ∈ Ψ and an input p ∈ P , the possible resulting states ψ ′ ∈ Ψ are determined by
starting with the host h in all configurations c ∈ D corresponding to the observed state ψ ,
applying the operation p, and measuring the resulting states ψ ′ through explicit testing.
W is then the set of all triples (p, ψ,ψ ′) determined in this fashion. Each triple (p, ψ,ψ ′)
is a transition rule for input p ∈ P and state ψ ∈ Ψ .
This state machine is a mathematical ideal that illustrates the difficulty of the
configuration management process. Before each operation, a host can be in any one of
a large number of actual states c ∈ D. The observed state ψ ∈ Ψ corresponds to a subset
of possible actual states A(ψ) ⊂ D. Without further constraints, a typical operation p
seems non-deterministic, because the actual states that can result from applying p are
the set p(A(ψ)) = {p(d) | d ∈ A(ψ)}. Thus it is possible that p, when applied to a
host in observed state ψ , can produce one of several observed states T (A(ψ)) as a result.
Without further information, one cannot limit p(A(ψ)) to be the particular configuration
d ′ ∈ p(A(ψ)) that is actually in effect after applying p. This uncertainty leads to apparent
non-determinism when applying configuration operations.
The goal of configuration management is to achieve reproducibility of effect for
configuration operations. A particular operation, applied to a host in a given observed state,
should always result in a predictable observed state as an outcome. To accomplish this, one
must choose and utilize a deterministic sub-automaton (Ψ ′,P ′,W ′) of the configuration
automaton (Ψ ,P,W) (where Ψ ′ ⊂ Ψ , P ′ ⊂ P , and W ′ ⊂ W). Whether a given sub-
automaton behaves deterministically depends upon several factors, including the actual
states that one allows a host to reach, the choice of observed tests, and the set of operations
Qψ ⊂ P that one allows to be applied to a host that exhibits a particular observed state ψ .
There are three interdependent techniques that can potentially assure reproducible behavior
within this sub-automaton:
1. Choose a small set of desirable actual states (configurations) C ⊂ D and arrange for
operations not to produce configurations outside of C. This choice determines a limited
set of reachable observed states
Ψ ′ = T (C) = {T (c) | c ∈ C}. (1)
If C contains precisely one actual state per observed state, then the map from actual state
c to observed state ψc is a bijection and the sub-automaton is deterministic.
2. For each observable state ψ ∈ T (C), carefully limit the set of operations Qψ that it
is permissible to apply to a machine in that observed state, thus limiting the potential
effects of each operation. This reduces the amount of potential variation of the actual
configuration due to operations.
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3. Construct a new set of tests T ′ ⊃ T that distinguishes between configurations c, c′ with
identical observed states ψc = ψc′ according to T , but for which the observed results of
applying an operation p ∈ Qψ differs according to T . In other words, find something
more to observe so that c, c′ will be considered distinct whenever p(c) and p(c′) are
distinct.
Current configuration management strategies differ in when and how these techniques are
applied, and the choices made are often controversial. For example, some configuration
tools assume that C is the set of states reachable by applying arbitrary sequences of
operations to a predetermined baseline state. Other tools severely constrain the sequences
of operations that can be applied to the baseline state. Still other approaches leave the
baseline state unconstrained and instead constrain the nature of applicable operations so
that their effect upon a host is simple and predictable. For example, we show in [23]
that convergent operations (as embodied in cfengine) have a particularly simple and
straightforward effect upon actual state.
There are two kinds of reproducibility, including local reproducibility and population
reproducibility. Local reproducibility means that the operations for a particular host
exhibit reproducible results in isolation. Local reproducibility does not imply population
reproducibility, in which an operation applied to a population of hosts produces consistent
and reproducible results for the population as a whole. We desire the latter, but will start
by defining and studying the former.
4. Local reproducibility
First we develop the concept of reproducibility for a single host h. Even though
each configuration operation itself is deterministic, a change in actual state from c to
c′ = p(c) may not effect a change in the observed state ψ; the observed state is
an unspecified function of the actual one. This results in situations where the same
configuration operation, applied to two configurations in the same observed state but
differing actual states, leads to two different observed states as a result. This can occur
if prior configuration operations left the two configurations in differing actual states that
are observed as identical, but for which further operations expose differences.
Informally, a strategy for configuration management is locally reproducible if it
imposes limits on the configuration automaton for a single host (described in the previous
section) so that the sub-automaton that results from these limits is deterministic. More
formally,
Definition 4. Suppose we have a host h, a set of desirable states C for h, a set of candidate
operationsP appropriate to h, a set of tests T that one can perform on h, and a map φ from
each observed state ψ ∈ T (C) to a subset φ(ψ) ⊂ P that it is appropriate to apply to h
when it is in the state ψ . Then the formal system (h, C,T ,P, φ) exhibits observed local
reproducibility (or simply local reproducibility) if the following two conditions hold:
1. For every configuration c ∈ C, and for every operation p ∈ φ(T (c)), p(c) ∈ C.
2. For every c, c′ ∈ C with T (c) = T (c′) and for every p ∈ φ(T (c)), we have
T (p(c)) = T (p(c′)).
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Proposition 1. Suppose that for every c ∈ C and every operation p ∈ φ(T (c)),
p(c) ∈ C. Under these conditions, the formal system (h, C,T ,P, φ) exhibits observed
local reproducibility exactly when the state machine (Ψ ,P,W) with states Ψ = T (C),
operations P , and transition rules
W = {(p,T (c),T (p(c))) | c ∈ C, p ∈ φ(T (c))} (2)
is deterministic.
Proof. Suppose we have a formal system exhibiting observed local reproducibility as in
Definition 4, and construct the state machine of the proposition. By hypothesis, the only
allowable operations change one configuration in C into another in C, so that this state
machine can be in one of a limited number of states T (C) ⊂ Ψ . Now start in a state
ψ ∈ T (C) and apply an operation p ∈ φ(ψ). Let c, c′ be two actual states such that
T (c) = T (c′) = ψ . Then by hypothesis, T (p(c)) = T (p(c′)), so that the result of
p is invariant of choice of c. Thus the state machine is deterministic. The converse is
similar. 
Usually the set C is not arbitrary, but is instead the result of applying configuration
operations to some known initial system state.
Axiom 4. For any host h, there is a baseline operation b that—when applied to any
configuration for the host—transforms it into a baseline configuration with a predictable
and repeatable actual state.
This operation b could be anything, including “buy another machine”. Without loss of
generality, we can eliminate the distinction between the operation b and the configuration
b produced by that operation. Thus b produces—and represents—an initial configuration
to which configuration management is applied.
Proposition 2. If P contains a baseline operator b, then a configuration c constructed
by starting at the baseline configuration and applying a series of operations from P
is completely determined by the sequence of operations applied since the last baseline
operator b, i.e., all operations prior to the last baseline can be ignored.
Proof. This is a direct consequence of the axiom; b erases all prior configuration
changes. 
Thus there is a one-to-one correspondence between sequences of operations since the
last baseline operation b and configurations c ∈ C. Thus we can represent each reachable
configuration unambiguously by such a sequence of operations. From now on, we will
unambiguously consider a sequence of operations pn ◦ · · · ◦ p1 ◦ b (beginning with
a baseline operation b) to denote the unique configuration resulting from applying that
sequence of operations to the host.
Some configuration management strategies achieve local reproducibility by strictly
utilizing a set of operations in a particular sequence [53,54].
Proposition 3. Suppose that P = {b, p1, . . . , pn}, and that
C = {b, p1 ◦ b, p2 ◦ p1 ◦ b, . . . , pn ◦ · · · ◦ p1 ◦ b}. (3)
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Suppose that φ(T (b)) = {p1} and let
φ(T (pk ◦ · · · ◦ p1 ◦ b)) = {pk+1} (4)
for 1 ≤ k < n. Then the formal system (h, C,T ,P, φ) exhibits observed local
reproducibility.
Proof. Starting at baseline b, we form the configurations b, p1 ◦ b, p2 ◦ p1 ◦ b, . . . , pn ◦
· · · ◦ p1 ◦ b. As b creates an actual state, and each operation is deterministic, the sequence
of operations uniquely determines an actual state. As observed tests are deterministic, the
observed state corresponding to this actual state is uniquely determined as well. 
This proposition is part of the theoretical grounding of Isconf [36,53,54]. Unconstrained
deterministic operations, when applied in a specific order, appear deterministic to any
observer utilizing deterministic tests as a mechanism for observing.
However, Proposition 3 is extremely limiting. The reachable states are attained by
applying prefixes of the sequence of configuration operations to the baseline configuration.
This results in a sequence of configurations c1, . . . , cn+1, where going forward from
ci to ci+1 requires operation pi , while going backward requires starting over from the
baseline state [36]. Since re-baselining a host is currently a matter of erasing all of the
host’s contents and starting over, the machine is unavailable for use during this process.
This can lead to hidden costs from lost productivity due to machine downtime [47]. A
generally applicable configuration management strategy should—within limits—be able
to change a host from any state to any other without having to rebuild the entire host from
scratch.
The polar opposite of the strategy of Proposition 3 is to consider all operations to be
applicable at all times, and instead constrain the nature of operations to provide observed
local reproducibility. In this strategy, we allow application of all possible sequences of
operations in P .
Definition 5. For a set of operations P , let P∗ be given by
P∗ = {pk ◦ · · · ◦ p1 | pi ∈ P} ∪ {ε} (5)
where ε represents the empty operation (“do nothing”). This is the set of all sequences of
operations from P .
The set of reachable actual states is determined by applying all possible sequences of
operations.
Definition 6. For a set of operations P and a given baseline configuration b, let the set of
configurations reachable from b through P be given by
P∗(b) = {p∗(b) | p∗ ∈ P∗} ⊂ D. (6)
We define a more limited notion of local reproducibility for this specific case:
Definition 7. Suppose we have a system containing a host h, a baseline state b, a set of
operationsP , and a set of tests T . For all observed states ψ ∈ T (C), let Φ(ψ) = P , so that
all operations apply to all observed states. Then we say the system (h, b,T ,P) exhibits
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observed local reproducibility (or simply local reproducibility) whenever the system
(h,P∗(b),T ,P,Φ) exhibits observed local reproducibility according to Definition 4.
This simpler notion of local reproducibility makes it possible to unambiguously discuss
the local reproducibility of a particular operation p ∈ P .
Definition 8. With respect to the formal system (h, b,T ,P), an operation p ∈ P exhibits
observed local reproducibility (or simply local reproducibility) if for every c, c′ ∈ P∗(b)
with T (c) = T (c′), T (p(c)) = T (p(c′)). In this case, we say that p is a locally
reproducible operation.
Proposition 4. The system (h, b,T ,P) exhibits observed local reproducibility exactly
when every operation p ∈ P exhibits observed local reproducibility with respect to the
system (h, b,T ,P).
Proof. Suppose the system (h, b,T ,P) exhibits observed local reproducibility. Then
by Definition 7, the system (h,P∗(b),T ,P,Φ) exhibits observed local reproducibility,
where Φ(ψ) = P for all observed states ψ ∈ T (P∗(b)). Then for each operation
p ∈ P , the second condition in Definition 4 is true, and for every c, c′ ∈ P∗(b) with
T (c) = T (c′), T (p(c)) = T (p(c′)). Thus the operation p exhibits observed local
reproducibility.
Conversely, suppose that for all p ∈ P , p exhibits observed local reproducibility.
Then by the same argument as above, the second condition of Definition 4 is true. Since
C = P∗(b), every c ∈ C can be expressed as pk ◦ · · · ◦ p1 ◦ b, where pi ∈ P . Thus
p(c) = p◦ pk ◦· · ·◦ p1◦b ∈ P∗(b) = C and the first condition of Definition 4 is true. Thus
the formal system (h,P∗(b),T ,P,Φ) exhibits observed local reproducibility according to
Definition 4, so that by Definition 7, the system (h, b,T ,P) does so as well. 
In other words, a set of operations exhibits observed local reproducibility with respect
to a baseline b if each operation has a reproducible observed effect on each reachable
configuration c ∈ P∗(b). This is the definition of reproducibility that best models the
operation of cfengine [7,8,12] and related convergent agents.
Note that local reproducibility of P trivially implies local reproducibility of P∗.
Although P∗ is infinite, P∗(b) is a subset of a finite (though large) set of configurations,
as the total possible configurations are finite.
4.1. Configuration parameters
Our next step is to develop some examples of locally reproducible configuration
operations. To do this, we must develop a set of simple component operations from which
those operations can be constructed. The most common configuration operation is to set a
parameter to a given value. Surprisingly, the precise meaning of this operation is difficult
to describe. Many convenient assumptions about configuration parameters do not hold in
practice:
1. Parameter values are not necessarily independent; a setting for one parameter often
determines the potential settings for another. For example, the protocols listed in
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/etc/protocols determine what makes sense as a line in /etc/services; a host’s
domain name is part of its fully qualified hostname.
2. The meanings of parameter values are conditional; the setting for a parameter may have
no effect upon behavior unless other parameters are set appropriately. For example,
one must enable tftp before security settings for the protocol become meaningful.
Otherwise they have no effect.
Thus it is misleading to consider the set of all configurations to be a pure Cartesian product
of a static number of independent parameters.
In the absence of further information, a configuration is a long string of binary bits.
A configuration parameter is a named function of a subset of the bits comprising the
configuration.
Definition 9. With respect to a set of reachable configurations C, a configuration parameter
Y is a function from C into some parameter value range.
A configuration parameter provides a human-readable depiction of an internal
configuration state. Parameters can be dependent upon one another; bits that determine
one parameter can overlap with the bits that determine another. The range of a parameter
can be any type whatever, such as the common types integer and string, but can also be
a composite type such as a structure or array. Constants are valid parameters, represented
by constant functions.
Parameters are representations of the structure of configuration. If one sets a parameter,
the representation must change accordingly.
Definition 10. Given a set of configurationsD and an operation p ∈ P , we say that p sets
the parameter Y to the value v if for all c ∈ D, Y (p(c)) = v.
An operation “sets a parameter” if the parameter’s external (or human-readable)
representation correctly depicts the act of setting the parameter.
Definition 11. For Y a parameter and v a value, the notation “Y := v” represents the
configuration operation that sets the value of the parameter Y to v.
4.2. Observed parameters
Our next step is to define the conditions under which we consider a configuration
parameter (or any other function of configuration) to be “observed”.
Definition 12. A parameter Y (or any other function of configuration) is completely
observed (or simply observed) if there is a function ρ of observed states T (c), where
ρ(T (c)) = Y (c) for all c ∈ D. Otherwise, Y is partially observed.
In other words, a parameter Y is observed if—given only test results—one can determine
its values. All constant values v, all tests t ∈ T , and all explicit functions of ψ = T (c) are
completely observed.
Completely observed parameters have a simple relationship with observed local
reproducibility.
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Proposition 5. Suppose that X and Y are configuration parameters and that Y is
completely observed. Then the configuration operation “X := Y ” exhibits observed local
reproducibility.
Proof. Let c ∈ C and assume that Y is completely observed. Then there is a function ρ
of observed states T (c), where ρ(T (c)) = Y (c). Thus Y is completely determined by the
results of observed tests. After the operation “X := Y ”, X is completely determined by
those tests as well. Thus there is exactly one state transition in the configuration state
machine for each invocation of “X := Y ”, so this operation exhibits observed local
reproducibility. 
Conversely,
Proposition 6. If X and Y are configuration parameters and Y is not completely observed,
then “X := Y ” need not exhibit observed local reproducibility.
Proof. As a trivial counterexample, consider the case where T = {X > 1}. “X := Y ” can
set X to any achievable state of Y , including, e.g., 0 and 2. Thus the outcome of “X := Y ”
is not a function of the test results on its input, and “X := Y ” does not exhibit observed
local reproducibility. 
4.3. Properties of locally reproducible operations
Several relatively straightforward propositions demonstrate the properties of locally
reproducible operations in more detail. Again, the propositions in this section concern the
formal system (h, b,T ,P) with reachable configurations C = P∗(b).
Proposition 7. The set of operations P is locally reproducible if and only if for each
operation p ∈ P and each configuration c ∈ C = P∗(b), T (p(c)) is a function τp of T (c).
Then we can express the observed state of a configuration after p as T (p(c)) = τp(T (c)).
Proof. This is a direct and obvious consequence of the definition of observed local
reproducibility. A set of operations exhibits observed local reproducibility if and only if
the resulting observed state after each operation is a function of the observed state before
the operation; τp makes this functional relationship explicit. 
Because locally reproducible operations p correspond to state functions τp , they also
exhibit the typical properties of functions, notably, that a composition of functions is also
a function:
Proposition 8. A composition of operations that each exhibits observed local
reproducibility also exhibits observed local reproducibility.
Proof. Let T be a set of tests and C = P∗(b) represent a set of configurations. Let c ∈ C.
Consider locally reproducible operations p and q on C. Since p is locally reproducible, for
any particular observed state T (c) of c, T (p(c)) = τp(T (c)) is a constant. Likewise for
q , for any observed state T (p(c)), T (q(p(c))) = τq (τp(T (c))) is a constant. Thus for any
observed state T (c), T (q(p(c))) = T (q ◦ p(c)) is a constant and q ◦ p exhibits observed
local reproducibility. 
230 A. Couch, Y. Sun / Science of Computer Programming 53 (2004) 215–253
As composing operations on a configuration is the same as applying them sequentially,
this means that an arbitrary sequence of locally reproducible operations is locally
reproducible as well. However, the above does not yet tell us how to implement local
reproducibility for the operations p that we might compose.
Some counter-intuitive results arise straightforwardly from the model.
Proposition 9. Configuration operations containing linear code (with no branches) do not
necessarily exhibit observed local reproducibility.
Proof. As a counterexample, we construct an operation p1 whose outcome is not a
function of prior observed state. Let X and Y be two configuration parameters of our host.
Let operation p1 be “X := Y ”, let operation p2 be “Y := 1”, and let operation p3 be
“Y := 2”. Let T consist of one test t1: “X > 1”. Then p1 is not locally reproducible;
it has two outcomes depending upon unobserved pre-existing conditions. There are two
reachable latent states Y == 1 and Y == 2 that are not measured by the tests T and
determine the observed outcome. These latent states are constructed by applying operations
p2 or p3, respectively. 
Note that if Y was a constant, p1 would exhibit observed local reproducibility; its non-
reproducibility arises from the fact that Y ’s value is unpredictable.
This situation occurs often in practice, such as when changing file protection modes.
Suppose there is a file “foo” that we wish to make executable and configuration operations
p1, p2, and p3, where p1 is “chmod ugo+X foo”, p2 is “chmod 744 foo”, and p3
is “chmod 644 foo”. Suppose T consists of one test “test -x foo” where the user
running the test is not the owner or in the file’s group; this tests whether the file is
executable to world. Then the observed states of applying p2 and p3 are indistinguishable,
because neither p2 nor p3 makes the file executable to the user performing the test.
But performing p1 after p2 makes the file world-executable (protection 755, because
“X”, the conditional execution flag, makes it fully executable if any execute bit is set),
while performing p1 after p3 leaves it completely unexecutable (protection 644). Similar
situations occur during stream editing of files.
Likewise, conditional statements based upon partially observed data pose serious
problems:
Proposition 10. A conditional statement “if (F) then X := G” need not produce a locally
reproducible outcome if the value of F is not completely observed, even if the value of G
is completely observed.
Proof. As a counterexample, consider the boolean configuration parameters X and Y ,
where the test set T = {X == 0} so that the value of Y is not tested. Consider the
code
X := 0; if (Y ) then X := 1. (7)
This is equivalent to “X := Y ”, which makes X partially observed as well. The fact that the
assignment statements only set X to observed (constant) values 1 and 0 does not force the
result of the conditional (based upon a partially observed value) to be completely observed
as well. 
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4.4. Constructing locally reproducible operations
It is easy to construct a locally reproducible configuration operation. Each locally
reproducible configuration operation p corresponds to a function from initial states ψ
to final states ψ ′, in the context of a set of reachable states C. This operation must thus
depend upon the value of ψ and avoid conditioning its effects on the values of other variant
properties of the host or network.
In this section, all propositions refer to the formal system (h, b,T ,P), and C = P∗(b)
is the set of all reachable configurations.
Proposition 11. Let p be a configuration operation. Let ψ be an observed state of a
configuration c measured before applying p. Let X be a configuration parameter. If p
consists solely of setting X to a value that is a function only of ψ (and perhaps constants),
then p is locally reproducible.
Proof. Let ψ be the state of the configuration before the operation p. By hypothesis, p
has the form “X := F(ψ)”, where F is a function only of observed state ψ . We know
that this assignment is well defined because dom X = C. We must show that the resulting
observed state ψ ′ after applying p is a function of the previous observed state. Because
F is a function, there is one and only one outcome for F(ψ) for each state ψ , so that the
resulting value of X in the actual configuration changes as a function of observed state
whether it is observed or not. As the resulting observed state is a function of the resulting
configuration p(c) by Axiom 3, it must change predictably and repeatably as well. 
Setting parameters to functions of observed state is sufficient but not necessary to achieve
observed reproducibility. Trivially, setting any parameter that does not appear in any test
has a reproducible effect (because the effect cannot be reflected in test results).
The above result is easily generalized.
Corollary 1. Suppose an operation p consists only of a sequence of assignments “X :=
F(ψ)”, where X is a configuration parameter, ψ is held constant throughout, and F is a
function of ψ alone. Then p is locally reproducible.
Proof. A sequence of assignments is the same as a composition of the operations that
perform the assignments. By Proposition 11, each one of these is locally reproducible.
By Proposition 13, a composition of any two is locally reproducible. By induction on the
number of assignments, the result easily follows. 
Conditional statements pose no difficulties (although they contain more than one
possible execution path) because repeatability is guaranteed by the constancy of ψ .
Proposition 12. Suppose a configuration operation p has the form
if (F(ψ)) then X := G(ψ) (8)
where X is a configuration parameter and F and G are functions whose values solely
depend upon the current observed state ψ . Then p is locally reproducible.
Proof. We must show that the observed outcome is a function of ψ . There are only
two possible outcomes. If F(ψ) is 0 (false), nothing happens, so the result of all such
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operations is locally reproducible, having the same observed state as the original. If F(ψ)
is 1 (true), the assignment “X := G(ψ)” occurs, and is locally reproducible because of
Proposition 11. Since taking the branch is itself a function of observed state, the whole
branch is locally reproducible as well. 
Corollary 2. A sequence of conditional assignments of the form
if (F(ψ)) then X := G(ψ) (9)
where F and G are functions only of ψ and constants, is locally reproducible.
Proof. Repeat the argument of Corollary 1 with these conditional statements. The proof is
trivial given the constancy of ψ , F(ψ), and G(ψ) during the operation.
With the above results in mind, we are ready to relate reproducibility to the structure of
configuration operations as programs.
Proposition 13. Let p be a configuration operation and c a configuration. Let ψ be the
observed state of c. Suppose that when p is applied to c, it:
1. Sets parameters to values that are functions of ψ .
2. Takes program branches (conditionals) depending only upon the values of functions
of ψ where ψ is held constant throughout p.
Then if the operation p terminates successfully on every configuration c in its domain, p
exhibits observed local reproducibility.
Proof. Assume that p is an operation conforming to the above hypotheses. Let G =
(V , E) be the program graph of the operation p as a procedure. Construct the graph to
have nodes v ∈ V for each parameter assignment statement and conditional. Since p
obeys the rules above, this graph takes branches based solely upon functions of a static
observed state ψ that does not change during the execution of p. This means that any
loop taken during execution of p will never terminate, because its branch condition cannot
change during the execution of p. Since p terminates, loops are not present and the program
takes a predetermined finite path of vertices v1, . . . , vk through the program graph for each
particular choice of ψ . Along that path, it executes a predetermined sequence of assignment
statements, so that Corollary 1 applies and the result is locally reproducible. 
It is rather important, however, that the operation utilize only static values of ψ during
execution of p, and not dynamic re-measurements of tests during p. One can get away
with limited dynamic measurements of ψ , provided one is careful not to use two differing
measurements of ψ simultaneously:
Proposition 14. Suppose that p as described in Proposition 13 is also allowed to re-
measure the whole observed state ψ at any time during its execution, as well as setting
parameters and branching based upon functions of the observed state ψ . Only one
measurement of ψ is available at a time and any setting must be a function of the most
recent measurement. If p terminates, the result is locally reproducible, but not all processes
are guaranteed to terminate.
A. Couch, Y. Sun / Science of Computer Programming 53 (2004) 215–253 233
Proof. Let p be an operation that conforms to the hypotheses of the proposition. Repeat
the construction of the program graph G = (V , E) from the proof of Proposition 13 with
one change: include re-measurement operations for observed state in the program graph.
It is now possible for loops to occur during execution, but if the operation terminates, we
claim that it still produces a locally reproducible state.
First, any terminating computation p will have executed a finite sequence of operations
v1, . . . , vn within its program graph, where each vi is either a parameter assignment
statement or re-measurement of entire state. Without loss of generality, we can express this
sequence as an alternating sequence m1, a1, m2, a2, . . . , mk, ak where each mi measures
state and each ai represents a series of assignment statements relative to that state.
Now consider what happens during this sequence to two configurations c and c′ with the
same observed state. We must show that for both c and c′, the branches taken are identical,
leading to identical paths with identical effects. Since c and c′ have the same observed
state, the results of m1 are the same in each case; hence the operations a1 done between m1
and m2 are identical in purport. These statements are locally reproducible, so the resulting
observed state m2 is the same in both cases. Proceeding by induction for m2 . . . mk , it
is easy to demonstrate that the exact same assignment statements and branches are taken
overall, so that the result of p is independent of the actual configuration c or c′. Thus p is
locally reproducible. 
4.5. Limits on locally reproducible operations
This section clarifies some limitations implicit in the definition of local reproducibility.
There is a problem with basing values and conditionals on any more dynamic information
than the current observed state:
Proposition 15. Suppose that an operation p consists of a sequence of configuration
actions, including actions that set a parameter to a value and actions that re-measure
observed state. Suppose that the value to which a parameter is set can be a function of
more than one prior measurement of observed state during the sequence. Then p does not
necessarily exhibit observed local reproducibility.
Proof. Suppose you have two configuration parameters X and Y . Initially X is 0 and Y is
either 1, 2, or 3. Define two tests:
t1 = (X == 1) && (Y == 1) (10)
t2 = (X == 2) && (Y == 2) (11)
where && is logical “and”. The initial observed state ψ of this system gives no information
about Y ; ψ(t1) and ψ(t2) are both false. We will build a p utilizing repeated measurements
of state that exposes the latent value of Y , thus resulting in three distinct outcomes. Let p
proceed as follows:
1. X := 1.
2. Measure observed state ψ1.
3. X := 2.
4. Measure observed state ψ2.
5. X := ψ1(t1) · 1 + ψ2(t2) · 2 + (!ψ1(t1) && !ψ2(t2)) · 3.
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This program is equivalent to “X := Y ”. Before this, there was one observed state. After
this, there are three possible observed states ψ ′ depending upon Y :
1. If Y == 1, then ψ ′(t1) is 1 and ψ ′(t2) is 0.
2. If Y == 2, then ψ ′(t1) is 0 and ψ ′(t2) is 1.
3. If Y == 3, then ψ ′(t1) is 0 and ψ ′(t2) is 0.
Thus the operation exhibits apparent non-determinism and its result is non-
reproducible. 
This curious and counter-intuitive example shows that inappropriate observation can
compromise reproducibility. If the procedure above used one state at a time, it would
not have been possible to expose the state of Y non-reproducibly, starting at the given
initial state. Since Y never changes according to our assumptions, the transition in state
for the action “X := 1” is reproducible. Once X is 1, the value of Y is exposed by the
state transition. Only using the results of both snapshots simultaneously leads to non-
reproducible behavior: three result states for the same input state and operation. Combining
measurements leads to non-reproducibility of effect, through exposure of non-operative
latent variables that might not affect desired behavior at all.
This discussion strongly supports the cfengine [7,8,12] procedure of collecting the
values of all class variables before starting the configuration process. If the class variables
are all collected before the process begins, and changes are only conditioned by these static
variables, then the result is reproducible.
4.6. Static verification of local reproducibility
In current practice, the correctness of configuration operations as programs is
determined by explicit testing on real hosts [55,56]. Explicit testing of configuration
operations is both time-consuming and non-comprehensive. A configuration operation
takes as its input the whole pre-existing configuration and produces a new configuration as
a result. The complexity of input and output make comprehensive testing both expensive
and impractical.
We seek methods whereby the correctness of a given configuration operation can be
proven mathematically (or by a program compiler) without actually testing the code. The
theory of program correctness [44] provides techniques that mathematically verify selected
runtime properties of relatively simple programs without executing them. The relatively
simple structure of many configuration management operations suggested to us that this
theory might apply to them. A mathematical proof that a program has a particular property
is called a static verification of the property, in contrast to the dynamic verification that
comes from explicit testing of the program.
Theorem 1. For an arbitrary configuration operation p, conformance to the hypotheses
of Proposition 14 is statically verifiable.
Proof. First, it is straightforward to verify mechanically whether an arbitrary function p
has the exact form of the code in Proposition 14, i.e., the code consists only of parame-
ter settings, branches, and re-measurements of observed state, where each parameter set-
ting or branch takes as input a specific function F . This step rejects many choices for p
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as unverified; p cannot employ subroutines, recursion, or local variables other than config-
uration parameters (set-only) and observed states (read-only, as arguments to functions).
If p satisfies the above requirements, we must still determine whether all the functions
F that compute parameter values or branch conditions are actually deterministic functions
of the current state ψ . This is true only if there are no other inputs to F other than ψ ,
no randomly determined values are used in computing the value of F , and all functions
employed inside F are deterministic. Checking this is a matter of constructing the data
dependency graph for F (and for any functions that F might call) and checking that no
data source in the graph is unobserved or uninitialized. These are clearly static properties
of each F , and we are done. 
Thus there is a static boolean test σ that can be applied to p, where if σ(p) is 1 (true), p
is locally reproducible, while if it is 0 (false), no conclusions can be made about p. While
this result is very limited in scope, pertaining to only one kind of configuration operation,
it demonstrates that static verification is possible. Much further work will be required
to understand the limits of static verification in the context of realistic configuration
management tools.
Proposition 14 is sufficient but not necessary for observed reproducibility; accordingly
the verification in Theorem 1 is sufficient but not necessary to assure observed repro-
ducibility. There are many operations p that violate the conditions of the theorem but
exhibit observed determinism. Particularly, any operation that utilizes an external and un-
known function to compute observed values cannot be validated in this manner, but may
exhibit observed reproducibility anyway. The verification also rejects many operations that
are observably reproducible for completely superficial reasons. Any operation containing
a phrase equivalent to “if (false) . . . ”, where the braces contain non-conforming code, will
fail the verification even though it may be otherwise safe. Even if a variable X is unob-
served, the statement “X := X −X” makes it observed and constant. Operations containing
these statements may be locally reproducible, but will be rejected by the validation.
Programs that pass this verification will have the same effect each time we use them
on a system in a particular behavioral state, but we still have no information on the nature
of this reproducible effect. More important, we do not even know whether successfully
verified programs will ever terminate for a given input. All we know is that on a particular
host, a verified operation that worked once will continue to work exactly the same way if
applied again in the same situation.
The above theorem may seem limiting until one examines the restrictions of
Proposition 14 alongside the operations embodied in current configuration management
tools. Most operations embodied in these tools conform to the requirements of the
proposition and can be statically verified. In particular, most of cfengine’s primitives are
verifiable in this manner.
5. Population reproducibility
We next turn our attention to assuring reproducibility of operations over a population
of hosts. Such reproducibility is extremely important as a cost-saving measure. If we must
validate the behavior of each host of a population separately, it becomes very expensive
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to build large networks. Ideally, we should be able to test one particular host in order to
understand the behavior of a population.
Theorem 1 allows one to be sure that anomalous behavior of a configuration process
is the fault of heterogeneity of response rather than a fault of the configuration process
itself. Given a set of configuration processes possessing this assurance, one can then use
the responses of hosts to reproducible processes to map the heterogeneities in a network
reliably and know that one is mapping actual differences in hosts, not differences due to
bugs in configuration processes.
Population reproducibility is distinct from local reproducibility; it is a property instead
of the latent differences in hosts and configurations.
Definition 13. If, for any subset of a population of hosts whose configurations are in the
same observed state, an operation p results in identical observed final states over the subset,
then p exhibits observed population reproducibility (or simply population reproducibility).
Equivalently, an operation exhibits population reproducibility if the configuration state
machines for all the hosts in the population are identical.
Local reproducibility does not imply population reproducibility.
Proposition 16. An operation that is locally reproducible on every host to which it applies
can fail to exhibit population reproducibility.
Proof. As a counterexample, consider an operation applied to hosts with differing oper-
ating systems. Suppose that p is the operation of copying a constant xinetd.conf into
/etc/. The population reproducibility of this operation has no dependence upon its imple-
mentation; it is a property of the operating system. If the operating system does not support
the xinetd abstraction, the operation does nothing to behavior. Consider also an operation
that exposes a bug in one OS that is not present in another. There are many other such latent
variables that cause the same operation on different hosts to yield different outcomes. 
5.1. Preserving population reproducibility
While local reproducibility is relatively easy to achieve, population reproducibility
remains a pressing problem, and there is no currently available tool that addresses it
sufficiently. In particular, one cannot achieve population reproducibility solely by limiting
reachable states. Consider the example above of xinetd.conf. Even if there is only one
state “enabled” for xinetd, this does not affect xinetd unless the software for xinetd
exists on the host and can thus be affected.
There is one overarching observation that motivates our approach to population
reproducibility:
Proposition 17. If all configuration processes are verified as locally reproducible
according to Theorem 1, and one observes population differences in behavior in applying
these processes, then the variation must be due to latent preconditions in the population
rather than artifacts in the processes.
Proof. These processes have effects that are observably locally reproducible. If their
effects differ for two hosts in a population, then since they are locally reproducible
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in isolation, they will always differ in the same way regardless of when the operations
are applied. Hence some other factor is causing the difference, and the only other variants
are host identity and preconditions. 
Corollary 3. A locally reproducible process that differs in effect over hosts in a population
can be used to test for heterogeneity of latent variables within the population.
Thus one way of assuring population reproducibility is to utilize locally reproducible
actions that fail to be population reproducible to expose each latent variable in the
population. With latent variables exposed, we can form equivalence classes of hosts with
the same latent structure, and condition further configuration changes by that structure.
Theorem 2. Suppose we have a finite set of operations P defined on a finite population of
hostsH, where each host h ∈ H can attain a finite set of configurations Ch, and p ∈ P is a
function from Ch to Ch when executed on each host h, and that we choose a subsetQ ⊂ P∗
of sequences of operations we wish to use. Then for any finite set of observed tests T , there
is a finite set of tests T ′ such thatQ exhibits population reproducibility over C and T ∪T ′.
Proof. The construction consists of drawing distinctions between hosts (hosts) that exhibit
different behaviors, in a manner inspired by Brown’s calculus of distinctions [6].
Our goal is to build a new set of tests T ′ such that for the combined tests T ∪ T ′, the
operations in Q exhibit observed population reproducibility, so that applying an operation
to a subset of configurations exhibiting the same state ψ makes all configurations in the
subset exhibit the same final state ψ ′.
We construct T ′ as follows. For each operation q ∈ Q, the results of applying q to the
whole populationH of hosts may not agree. For each operation q ∈ Q that does not agree
in observed effect across the population, form a set of equivalence classes H˜ partitioning
H into subsets of hosts h˜ ⊂ H whose observed tests agree. For each one of these subsets,
let T ′ contain a test that is 1 (“yes”) for the members of the subset and 0 (“no”) otherwise.
The claim is that the operations P exhibit population reproducibility for the tests T ∪ T ′.
The reason that this works is that trivially, by construction, the tests in T ′ make it
impossible for an arbitrary set of hosts to have the exact same state unless the effects
of Q agree. The states in T ′ distinguish between hosts for whom the phenomenological
behavior of operations differs. If a subset of hosts has the same state, this means that this
subset is also contained in the same equivalence class of every equivalence partitioning of
hosts; hence all operations agree on the subset. 
The above construction is impractical, requiring O(2|T | · |Q|) operations to carry it
out. The point of the theorem is that this process is not mathematically impossible. By
exploiting the construction in the proof, however, it is possible to deal with population
non-reproducibility incrementally, one deviation at a time, adding tests to T ′ one by one.
In this way, our state of knowledge grows with the operations we apply and observe.
There is an easy algorithm for adding a new sequence of operations q to Q. Start with
an existing set of tests T and an (empty) set of additional tests T ′. Start withQ empty. For
each new sequence of operations q ∈ P∗ to be added to Q,
1. Run q on the population of hosts to which it should apply.
2. Perform all tests in T ∪ T ′ on each host h to compute an observed state ψh .
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(a) If results are the same for all hosts, then q exhibits population reproducibility over
the hosts to which it applies.
(b) If results are different, then form equivalence classes of hosts H˜, where for h, h′ ∈
h˜ ∈ H˜, ψh = ψh′ . For each equivalence class h˜, and a configuration c, add the test
“h(c) ∈ h˜” to T ′.
Thus
Proposition 18. If the above process is undertaken for every q to be added to Q, then as
time goes to infinity and processes q are applied to all hosts in all states, the resulting Q
exhibits population reproducibility with respect to T ∪ T ′.
Starting with all hosts at baseline, we keep a record of the operations performed on
each host and the results of all tests T ∪ T ′ on the host for each sequence of operations
attempted. Each host thus has a reasonable model of its own responses to configuration
management operations. Any time we happen to try the exact same sequence of operations
q on a sub-population of hosts, we compare the results. If these results differ among the
sub-population, we construct new tests in T ′, one for each equivalent sub-class of hosts.
This gives partial knowledge of the classification in Proposition 18, refined as needed and
as operations become applicable to the whole population.
In the above, T are the observed distinctions between configurations, while T ′ are syn-
thetic distinctions that represent variations in behavior whose cause is unknown. A typical
practitioner attempts to reduce T ′ by adding tests to T that measure the same effects.
Definition 14. A test t1 is observed as functionally dependent upon a test t2 (with respect
to a population of hosts H) if there is a function F such that for each observed state ψ on
each host, ψ(t1) = F(ψ(t2)).
Obviously there are very few choices for F : it is either the identity function, “not” (1
becomes 0, 0 becomes 1) or identically 0 or 1.
Definition 15. Suppose we have sets of tests T1 = {t11, . . . , t1 j }, T2 = {t21, . . . , t2k} ⊂ T .
For an observed state ψ , suppose that we write ψ(T1) = (ψ(t11), . . . , ψ(t1 j )) and
ψ(T2) = (ψ(t21), . . . , ψ(t2k)) to represent vectors of answers to the questions in T1 and
T2. Then T1 is observably functionally dependent upon a set of tests T2 if there is a function
F from vectors of test answers to vectors of test answers, such that for each measurement
ψ on each host, ψ(T1) = F(ψ(T2)).
Then one can remove tests from T ′ that are observed as functionally dependent upon tests
in T .
Proposition 19. Suppose a set of operationsP exhibits observed population reproducibil-
ity on a set of hosts H and set of tests T , and suppose that some test t ∈ T is observed
as functionally dependent upon a subset of tests T ⊂ T . Then P also exhibits observed
population reproducibility on H and T \{t} (the set of all tests except t).
Proof. A set of operations P exhibits observable population reproducibility exactly when
their observed effect is a function of observed state. Let the set of all observed effects be
denoted by Ψ , and let B : P × Ψ → Ψ denote this map. Suppose T = {t1, . . . , tk} and
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without loss of generality assume that for all ψ ∈ Ψ , ψ(tk) = F(ψ(t1), . . . , ψ(t j )) for
some function F . Let T ′ = T \{tk} and constructΨ ′ fromΨ by omitting results of the test
tk . Likewise construct the relation B ′ ⊂ P × Ψ ′ × Ψ ′ from B by removing results of the
test tk . Since the value of tk varies with the values t1, . . . , t j , for each ψ ′ ∈ Ψ ′ and each
p ∈ P , there is one and only one value for B ′(p, ψ ′). Thus B ′ is a function and P exhibits
observed population reproducibility relative to T ′. 
Thus one can remove tests from T that are observed to be functionally dependent upon
other tests in T . In practice, the administrator often discovers that checking one thing
suffices to check many things. Then that one check replaces the many checks previously
performed.
Thus, one can treat population reproducibility as a dynamically assured entity, by
creating synthetic tests, replacing synthetic tests with real tests that measure the same
effect, and removing redundant tests. In this manner, one can create a configuration state
machine that always represents configuration reproducibility to the best of its knowledge,
and grows in knowledge as configuration operations are tried on the population.
6. Relationship to current tools and practices
In this section, we compare our model of configuration management with the
capabilities of currently available configuration management tools and procedures. There
are several existing strategies for configuration management [24], including manual
configuration, custom scripting, structured scripting, convergent agents, and configuration
generators. Approaches differ greatly in scope and limits, from handling only the narrowly
defined task of post-installation configuration management, to managing the whole
lifecycle of an installed system, starting with “bare metal” (a host with no operating system
installed) and managing all changes to the host.
6.1. Manual configuration
In manual configuration, changes are made entirely by hand. This has the advantage that
it requires minimal startup time and leverages all knowledge of how to set up an individual
host in maintaining a network of them. However, human error or inconsistency are in-
evitable when hosts are managed by hand. In our model, these inconsistencies allow many
reachable states C to correspond to one observed state, thus creating the appropriate condi-
tions for latent preconditions to appear. The result is ongoing unpredictability of effect for
configuration operations, and a need to repeatedly troubleshoot configuration changes.
Suppose, for example, that an administrator installs a software package on some
unknown subset of hosts. If there is then a request to install another package upon which
that one depends, on another randomly chosen subset of hosts, then the new package
will function properly only on the hosts for which the prerequisite is installed. Different
versions of the prerequisite may lead to different behaviors of the desired package.
Inconsistent and undocumented use of manual procedures leads to “network rot” [16] in
which a network gradually drifts into disuse from subtle and undocumented inconsistencies
in host configurations.
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6.2. Custom scripting
The goal of custom scripting [5] is to encode manual procedures into repeatable
automatic procedures. Using a high-level language such as Perl, Python, Expect [40],
Prolog [20], or a shell, one crafts work-alikes for manual procedures. These scripts are
easy to write and easily verifiable as accomplishing the same tasks as manual procedures.
In the context of our model, the main weakness of custom scripts is the difficulty of
addressing and reacting to pre-existing conditions on a host. It is easy to write a script that
makes a specific configuration change to a newly built system, because the pre-existing
conditions do not vary much from host to host. It is relatively straightforward to write
a script that makes a predictable change to a host in a state already understood by the
author of the script. However, writing a script that operates upon a host possessing an
unknown state—with predictable results—is a challenge beyond the capabilities of most
administrators who are non-programmers.
Applying poorly engineered scripts to hosts in an unknown state leads to the same kind
of network rot as in manual configuration: variation in actual state (latent preconditions)
that later configuration changes can expose. In some ways, casual application of
custom scripts is even less effective than manual configuration. As scripts are applied
casually without regard to their preconditions, deviations in actual configuration increase
exponentially with respect to the number of changes to the same files, actually amplifying
the effects of manual configuration mistakes.
For example, consider a set of scripts that modify a configuration file, e.g., inetd.conf.
It is relatively easy to write a script that appends a new line to /etc/inetd.conf
describing a new service, but less easy to write one that only appends the line if it is
not already present. It is more difficult to also delete lines that might describe the same
service with different parameters, and harder still to avoid deleting other services with
similar names at the same time. If any of these conditions are not sufficiently addressed,
using the script on a network will create multiple versions of /etc/inetd.conf whose
contents depend upon the state of the file before the script was applied. Worse, the contents
of the file can vary with the number of times the script is repeated.
In practice, few scripts achieve the level of sophistication necessary to avoid this kind
of network rot. Typical scripts are written in haste by non-programmers to accomplish a
specific task in a specific environment. Each script requires preconditions that are often
poorly documented if at all. Applying a script to a host not satisfying its preconditions
leads to unpredictable results and variation in actual configuration. Scripts are often crafted
in haste for one-time use and then employed over a long timescale, leading to software
maintainability problems that specialized domain-specific languages have been crafted to
address [18,33,34]. These languages encapsulate commonly needed configuration changes
into robust subroutines that can be invoked when needed.
6.3. Structured scripting
Structured scripting is an attempt to make custom scripts more robust by providing
a framework that assures repeatable preconditions and manages portability between
heterogeneous sets of hosts. Isconf [36,53,54] structures configuration and installation
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scripts into “stanzas” whose execution order is held constant across a population of
hosts, assuring that hosts will be in similar—but perhaps not identical—states when
each script is applied. Stanzas can be affected by latent preconditions, so that identical
results are not assured. PIKT [46] adds macro facilities to normal scripting languages
to support portability over various operating systems and versions, so that one script
can operate within a heterogeneous environment. Arusha [33,34] embeds scripts into
overarching configuration files as part of configuration data, so that the relationship
between configuration generators and their data is clearly delineated and easily maintained.
Isconf and its relatives control latent preconditions by always invoking the exact same
sequence of scripts to configure a particular host. Regardless of the lack of sophistication
of each script, the preconditions for the next script are always the postconditions for
the last, so that each script always runs in a predictable and consistent environment.
Unfortunately, Isconf only succeeds when its component scripts do not make decisions of
their own—based upon latent preconditions—that create latent states. It assures repeatable
configuration effects only if it is used in a relatively homogeneous environment and its
scripts consist of simple, imperative changes.
Structured scripting does not scale well to heterogeneous environments. A set of Isconf
stanzas builds exactly one kind of host reliably, and other sets of stanzas are required to
build other kinds. While it is possible to re-use scripts in a heterogeneous environment [36],
this is not recommended by the original authors [54].
Isconf’s method for controlling preconditions makes it difficult to recover from
configuration problems one discovers in its stanzas. When one detects a latent problem
in an Isconf stanza, one must append the repair as the last stanza to avoid invalidating
the preconditions of prior stanzas. It is impossible to delete a stanza without changing
preconditions that might be required by subsequent scripts [36], so problems in a set of
deployed stanzas persist forever. A stanza problem or mistake, once discovered, persists
for the lifetime of the Isconf configuration, and one must continue to “break” every new
host with the problem before repairing it with a subsequent stanza.
The fact that “order matters” [53] is a daunting limitation of the method, and only true
because of the strategy by which Isconf deals with uncertainty of preconditions. Likewise,
a PIKT script can be written once but must be verified and validated on every kind of
target platform. In Arusha, scripts and their data are easy to relate, but the global effect of
all scripts in concert remains difficult to predict. In Isconf, PIKT, and Arusha, the rule of
practice remains “write scripts once, test everywhere”.
6.4. File distribution
Practitioners were quick to understand the limits of custom scripting and have struggled
for decades to design a more robust method of making configuration changes. The first
attempts to replace custom scripting employed file distribution. In this strategy, one
maintains master copies of crucial configuration files in a repository, and periodically
automatically distributes these copies to managed hosts [15,17]. Files are not updated
unless they change, implementing a primitive form of convergence, discussed below. This
largely avoids the problems of sequencing encountered in custom scripts, but replaces these
with problems of execution scalability and several capability limitations.
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File distribution schemes such as RDIST [15] rely upon a single master server that
runs local commands on clients to force them into compliance. This is an inherently serial
process that takes a very long time in large networks [17]. Also, the process is plagued
by the fact that all knowledge of the variations in platforms has to be codified and stored
on the central server, a daunting and error-prone manual task. RDIST also suffers from
lack of understanding of precedence between related file copying operations, as well as
excessive repository sizes as variations are required. One copy of each version of each file
must be stored. Initial strategies for combating this version explosion include replacing
simple distribution with remote execution of post-install scripts [17,28] that deal with
portability issues. This idea eventually evolved into the idea of using distributed convergent
agents.
From the standpoint of our model, the main problem with file distribution is that
context is never considered when changing a file. Consider for example the case where one
distributes a standard version of /etc/inetd.conf to all hosts. If a host does not contain
the applications to which the standard version refers, the host will not behave properly in
response to network requests. The existence or lack of existence of particular programs is
a latent precondition that affects the success of the copy operation.
6.5. Convergent agents
Convergence is a configuration management strategy wherein custom scripts are
replaced by an autonomous agent [7,8,12,16,20]. This agent interprets a declarative
configuration file that describes the ideal state of a host, then proceeds to make changes
that bring the host nearer to that ideal state. While the main configuration management
agent in contemporary use is cfengine [7,8,12], the concept has been applied in other
tools as well, including tools for repository management [16]. Cfengine’s declarations and
operation bears a strong resemblance to logic programming [20]. It first determines a set of
facts about the local system, then proceeds to correct any facts that are not in compliance
with its idea of system health.
The main benefit of cfengine over scripting is that we avoid forever the problem of
writing and maintaining fragile custom software. Cfengine’s subsystems for managing
configuration changes are robust, well engineered, and reusable. The problem of script
maintenance becomes instead the problem of declaration maintenance. The file of
declarations must be frequently updated, and unintended consequences can result from
uninformed modification of these declarations. Like Isconf and other tools, cfengine suffers
from the ability to create latent preconditions by uninformed and casual modification of its
declarations. Unlike Isconf, in which order and content must be preserved, in cfengine one
must instead preserve existing observed state.
For example, suppose one configures cfengine to edit /etc/inetd.conf and then
applies that script to one half of the hosts in an environment. As long as we retain that
stanza, the editing is a known precondition to further operations. If we delete that stanza,
the fact that the contents of /etc/inetd.conf differ among the population becomes a
constructed latent variable. To avoid this, the administrator must account for the possibility
of the change in all further use of cfengine, until there is no possibility that any host
contains the latent changes. This is a subtle version of the same effect as in Isconf:
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once touched, a file must remain managed (“observed”) forever. Declaration files are not
“correct” unless they cope with every possible constructed state of a system, including
those constructed by application of erroneous declarations.
A second benefit of cfengine over all prior forms of configuration management is that
the agent for a particular host has distributed authority about its own needs. This means
that no central repository must be kept of data about individual hosts; they can be easily
customized without maintaining a global snapshot of desirable state. Like earlier remote
scripting solutions, Cfengine allows files to be customized at the point of use, by “pulling”
masters from a master server and performing local edits to customize. This avoids the
explosions in repository size and complexity encountered in use of file distribution alone.
Cfengine’s class scheme for reusing declarations across similar populations of hosts is
a liability as well as a strength; it is common for changes in a reusable declaration to fail
to work properly on a sub-population of hosts. Since this is seldom discovered until it is
exposed by deployment on a large scale, it is often disruptive of service.
6.6. Environment polling
Cfengine’s cfenvd environment daemon is mainly a resource management strategy,
but it deserves mention as the first mechanism whereby a configuration management
tool can observe state other than that of the configuration files themselves [10]. Cfenvd
mainly measures performance parameters, including load averages, memory use, etc,
and provides flags to the configuration management process when these are out of
predefined bounds. While resource management is beyond the scope of this paper,
cfenvd’s capabilities definitely inspired the current work on observed state. Cfenvd
and related strategies inspired a parallel state machine model based upon linear algebra
and convergent operators [9,11] that most definitely guided us in seeking the algebraic
properties of operations.
Other than cfenvd, the literature has been surprisingly quiet on the rather obvious
relationship between configuration management and monitoring. In traditional practice,
these have been completely disjoint activities; first one creates a desired configuration, and
then it remains unchanging while monitoring serves for resource management. Researchers
are now beginning to study models of “autonomic computing” [37] and “grid computing”
wherein changing the configuration of a host or network is part of resource management.
Currently, most of this work is limited to configuration changes indicated by performance
data stored in log files. By contrast, our approach depends upon direct observation of
behavior by active probing of state.
6.7. File generation
In file generation, a description of appropriate network behavior is translated
dynamically into the precise configuration file contents that assure that behavior. This
translation is either accomplished centrally and then transmitted to clients [1,2,25,26]
or generated by the clients themselves through use of a distributed agent [33,34,48].
Ongoing administrative tasks include maintaining both the description and the agent;
as requirements change, new kinds of files must be generated. The description may be
maintained in many ways, including databases [25,26], XML [14,33,34,48], or plaintext.
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Generating files from a master template minimizes the problems of unintended
consequences encountered via the other methods, but changes the problem of debugging
scripts to that of writing appropriate generators.
6.8. Local reproducibility and current tools
The astute reader may have noticed that parts of our model align closely with the
structure of cfengine. Cfengine’s class variables are its representation of observed states.
Also, like many other management tools, cfengine blurs the distinction between action
and observation, so that all configuration actions contain implied observations (see [20]
for more details). Like many other configuration management tools, cfengine can only
observe low-level details, and cannot observe behavior except as expressed by the contents
of configuration files.
In cfengine, observed state is the same thing as managed state. If a configuration datum
is managed, cfengine will assure appropriate state. If a datum is not managed, cfengine
will presume that its state is appropriate. This leads to several ways one can violate local
reproducibility. The easiest way of all is to blindly copy a file from one (local) location to
another without regard for its contents. If the contents of this file happen to be changing
and unmanaged, havoc can result. Another potentially spectacular error is to copy a file
into an environment without first appropriately managing the environmental prerequisites,
e.g., installing a binary executable that refers to the dynamic library libz.so without first
assuring the presence of libz.so in the library path. If this file’s presence is controlled by
another agent than cfengine, e.g., rpm [4] invoked as a separate management process, then
the result of the change is unpredictable. Both of these results are direct results of lack of
attention to unmanaged detail.
This lack of sensitivity to unmanaged details affects most other configuration
management tools in varying ways. Generating all configuration files from a master
repository has nice reproducibility properties [1,2,14,25,26,45], but again, the user is at
the mercy of any unmanaged details, e.g., versions of software utilizing the configuration
files that are generated. When unmanaged details do not intrude, generated configurations
do not depend upon pre-existing configuration state, and each local configuration exhibits
local reproducibility. The main disadvantage of generators is that they are currently only
designed to manage system configuration in isolation from other forms of management,
and not designed to deal with unmanaged software environments in any way.
At the other end of the spectrum, unconstrained custom scripts are a reproducibility
disaster. They can potentially condition their effects upon any host attribute, managed or
not, and apparent non-reproducibility is easy to construct, as the very simple examples in
the previous sections demonstrate.
Even when using ad hoc and poorly engineered configuration scripts, one can gain
some measure of control over observed behavior by limiting the order of configuration
operations, as demonstrated in Proposition 3. This idea is exploited by Isconf and related
tools [36,53,54]. If the initial actual state of a system is static and repeatable (by, e.g.,
bare-metal recovery), and configuration operations must occur in a particular order, the
postconditions of the operations already completed are always the preconditions of the
next, and these are always the same for a particular host, so each host exhibits local
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reproducibility. Isconf’s idea of observed state is the set of phases completed so far.
Operations are otherwise unconstrained, and can do anything whatever, including invoking
configure or make. The generality of operations makes this technique applicable to
both configuration management and application management. But “order matters”, and
the results of re-ordering operations can be unpredictable and catastrophic.
Cfengine has little need for ordering in order to assure an appropriate observed
state. Clever cfengine users can make all operations aware of their preconditions and
postconditions and utilize exclusively declarative language to make the order of operations
completely unimportant, and even exploitable as part of a security mechanism [19,23,50].
In Maelstrom, operations are constructed to have effects that are invariant of the order in
which they are executed. Likewise, random variables in cfengine can randomize scheduling
of maintenance tasks. This randomness does not, however, preclude the presence of latent
unmanaged state.
Isconf and cfengine are convenient opposites. From the perspective of controlling
observed state, neither one is ideal. Isconf precisely controls total state at the cost of
losing the ability to observe and heal configurations on an ongoing basis; it manages state
without really observing it. If Isconf is not acting on a closed world, all context is lost
and it cannot recover except via a complete rebuild of the affected system. By contrast,
cfengine is designed to operate in an open world. Cfengine manages a small amount of
state (as compared with the true size and complexity of a configuration) and is self-healing
in the context that it controls, but has no built-in mechanism for starting from a predictable
baseline. From the standpoint of local reproducibility, the ideal tool is something between
Isconf and cfengine; able to assert a precise and reproducible local state, but also to react
to asynchronous changes by repairing problems.
6.9. Population reproducibility and current tools
No current tool deals effectively with the problem of population reproducibility. In
Isconf, one must build one configuration per kind of host; kinds must be known in advance.
In cfengine, one must know already what the classes of hosts are to be. In Arusha,
there must be one clause per host type, so types must also be known and planned for in
advance.
Careless use of cfengine can actually create latent preconditions that seriously
compromise population reproducibility. As the cfengine configuration file changes with
time, the data observed by cfengine also changes, and allows one to unknowingly create
latent heterogeneity within the population. The erroneous presumption that all unobserved
data are still at the baseline state leads to an exponential explosion of latent variables over
time.
As a very simple example, consider a situation in which:
1. At time z1, the administrator edits a change into the master configuration file that copies
a master version of hosts.allow into the file /etc/hosts.allow, that blocks tftp
access using the “tcp wrappers” security mechanism.
2. Between times z1 and z2, the administrator then runs this configuration on a random
selection of hosts from the set being managed. For example, run the change on all
stations currently up and running; leave out stations currently powered off.
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3. Then at time z2, the administrator changes the configuration file so that it no longer
manages /etc/hosts.allow, but rather copies a master version of inetd.conf into
/etc/inetd.conf to enable tftp.
4. Then between times z2 and z3, the administrator executes cfengine with this
configuration on different random selection of hosts. For example, apply the
configuration to all stations that are up and running, a different set of hosts than before.
The result is that hosts can be in one of four states after time z3:
1. No changes to either file.
2. /etc/hosts.allow changed, /etc/inetd.conf unchanged.
3. /etc/hosts.allow unchanged, /etc/inetd.conf changed.
4. Both files changed.
The state of /etc/hosts.allow is now latent; the current cfengine configuration does
not control that file. The result above is that hosts in state 4 above will fail to work
as documented, because of the latent state, while being indistinguishable (by cfengine
itself) from correctly functioning hosts in state 3. The state of /etc/hosts.allow became
unobserved due to changes in configuration, so that cfengine cannot correct the problem
by itself. Generalizing from this simple example, as states become latent, the number of
reachable latent states increases exponentially, creating a plethora of latent variables that
can affect future reproducibility.
The fix for this problem is to exert tight control of observed state during configuration
file changes. If observable states never become unobserved, the problem cannot happen.
The proper practice would be to change hosts.allow to a new state allowing tftp. In
other words, “once controlled, always controlled”.
Cfengine’s facilities for ongoing file editing makes this problem worse; use of editing
makes files “partially observed”. Lines controlled by editing are observed, while lines
unaffected by editing are latent. Over time, it is easy to mistakenly change part of a file from
observed to unobserved and vice versa. More detailed discussion of problems inherent in
file editing may be found in [23].
In Isconf, a strict sequence of unconstrained operations, while it always exhibits local
reproducibility, need not exhibit population reproducibility [36]. The population of hosts
may exhibit latent variables that are not apparent from examining an individual host.
Since one can only add corrective actions at the end of the sequence of actions while
preserving the population reproducibility that already exists, dealing with population non-
reproducibility in Isconf causes an explosion in the number of operations required for
configuration. Lack of population reproducibility is commonly due to errors or omissions
in the scripts, instead of undiscovered latent state variables in the population.
Isconf suffers from the same exponential explosion of states as cfengine, inside
the configuration scripts themselves. In Isconf, errors introduced at earlier stages of
configuration cannot be corrected without compromising overall validation. To preserve
validation, one must continue using erroneous configuration operations for each system
build, and apply fixes at the end, for the lifetime of the configuration file. One must literally
continue to break hosts in order to assure that the fix, when applied, will work. This is of
course due to Isconf’s complete inability to observe anything except its own state.
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6.10. Lessons learned from current tools
Current configuration management approaches all have the same problem of assuring
a deterministic response to configuration changes, but this goal must be balanced against
other factors. Two other factors include the effects of legacy management mechanisms and
semantic distance [18].
Configuration management is seldom accomplished by a single mechanism; a typical
strategy employs differing paradigms for differing purposes. Different parts of one
host might be managed by hand, by cfengine, by custom scripting, and by package
management [13,27,43,49,57]. There are pre-existing legacy tools that accomplish all of
these separate tasks well, but no tool that combines all of them into one coherent process.
One reason that legacy tools cannot be combined into a coherent strategy is what
we call the problem of “semantic distance”. It takes considerable re-engineering to
modify a working strategy for one kind of management to match a differing management
paradigm. For example, to translate a software package (e.g., an RPM [4] file) into an
equivalent cfengine script, one must reverse-engineer the effects of the pre-installation
and post-installation scripts provided with the package, and provide cfengine equivalents.
Converting custom scripts to cfengine declarations poses similar difficulties. The other
direction is somewhat easier: converting cfengine declarations to packages or scripts poses
little difficulty. But conversion of legacy scripts is simply too much work to be practical
for most administrators.
The result, in practice, is that a skilled practitioner will utilize all of the above
configuration management strategies in sequence:
1. Build the baseline configuration using imperative scripts (because they are already
written).
2. Build the software environment using package management (because certified packages
are available).
3. Build the initial configuration by file generation (because it limits options and latent
conditions).
4. Manage ongoing configuration changes by convergent agents (because they are non-
disruptive and decentralized).
5. Augment convergent agents with imperative scripts in cases where convergence requires
reverse-engineering of existing legacy tools.
6. When convergent agents fail to be practical to accomplish a change, rebuild the whole
host from scratch.
Each mechanism creates the preconditions necessary for the next one to function properly.
An example of this multi-level process is included in [36]. This multi-level model by nature
includes imperative legacy components, including post-install scripts for packages, custom
scripts, and managed scripts.
The main goal of our work to date is to make sense of this pre-existing pattern of layered
practice. The reason for applying each kind of management is to enforce preconditions
for the subsequent kinds, so that latent effects do not occur. At each changeover between
methods, the only persistent attribute of the system being configured is its pre-existing
configuration at the time of the switch. Imperative, ordered methods allow one to create
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consistent sets of preconditions with little or no constraints on scripts; scripts must only
avoid arbitrary choices. But with a few constraints on scripts—outlined above—one can
make the results locally reproducible starting at any reachable system state, and can utilize
the scripts for ongoing convergent management of systems. Further, scripts obeying these
constraints reliably expose latent conditions in networks that would remain unexposed if
less constrained scripts were used.
7. Implications of the model
The implications of our observed state model of configuration management are simple
yet subtle. The process of determining latent population variables during configuration
management has been historically disruptive and costly. The reason for this disruption is
that one never knew whether a configuration change was going to work properly on a
host without actually trying it on the host. With simple limits upon the scripts applied
to change configuration, coupled with a testing infrastructure, the process of management
straightforwardly exposes latent variables and thereafter treats hosts with a particular latent
variable differently than those without it. By maintaining a database of behavioral results
of operations, one can infer synthetic classes of hosts that react differently to configuration
commands, and maintain lists of commands that work properly on each kind of host.
Then, for a given host, one can infer which command to apply to achieve a particular
effect.
7.1. A new model of configuration management
The above process is precisely what a master practitioner would call a set of
“best practices” for a network: a set of rules of engagement that lead to predictable
behavior of the overall network. Lately practitioners have cooperated to create “books of
knowledge” [31,38] that outline both the taxonomy of the practice and possible approaches
to defining best practices. But the process of determining effective practices has remained
so far the role of a human. Using our model, this becomes instead the goal of a mechanical
process.
This leads us to propose a radically different model for configuration management than
has been previously utilized:
1. A set of configuration operations to apply.
2. A baseline operation to which the configuration operations will be applied.
3. A (possibly distributed) state engine that maintains the behavioral results of each
configuration change. This is a relatively complex component that autonomically
represents test data in the most efficient form, exploiting functional dependencies
between tests where possible. It is an autonomous machine that is not configured itself
during configuration management. Its overall job is to map from sequences of operations
to test results, to predict the likely result of a configuration operation.
4. A broker wrapper that actually invokes each configuration change, testing state before
and after the change. This communicates behavioral results to the state engine. It is
executed not on the host to be configured, but upon an external host whose sole role is
to be a configuration agent and monitor.
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5. A planner that utilizes the information from the state engine to plan the operations to
accomplish particular changes. This requires both knowledge of the intent of operations
as well as the documented effect of those operations.
6. A change engine that applies operations in a sequence predetermined by the planner
and logs the effects of each change on the state engine.
This takes much of the responsibility for insuring consistency and repeatability out of the
hands of the human administrator and places it instead upon a mechanical process for
ongoing quality assurance.
This is a radical idea that goes against accepted practice. The configuration is typically
treated as an inviolable reflection of behavior. Software is not perfect and its behavior after
a configuration change may be unpredictable. Configuration management is not just the
act of assuring correct configuration, but of assuring that the chosen configuration has a
desired effect. Intrinsically, this requires working around any bugs that might be present in
the software to be configured. Previously, this was the job of a human; in our model, the
process becomes somewhat more automatic.
While it may seem that the above process is intractable, several properties of the
configuration management process keep it tractable. First, the actual baselines from which
configuration management tools begin to configure a system are actually few in number.
The operations that administrators use to manage configuration are mostly composed from
the same common subset of primitive operations, even when using radically differing tools.
The abstractions for file copying, linking, and editing comprise one example, but also, large
populations of administrators deploy the same exact RPM packages on a daily basis.
If a community of administrators agrees to utilize the same baseline state and operations
for a set of hosts spanning multiple sites, they can then leverage the knowledge in all of
the separate state engines as a single global knowledge base. Deviant cases—usually only
mentioned in software release notes—become observable. Such a global knowledge base
would reflect the experiences of other administrators in assuring behavior, and would guide
new administrators to apply operations tested and validated by others.
For example, consider the subproblem of predicting the result of installing contributed
packages. It is shown in [32] that contributed packages cannot be trusted not to overwrite
and corrupt the base system, and that determining whether this will happen is a difficult
matter of analyzing the effects of post-install scripts. A knowledge base of the results of
installing each RPM in varying conditions would indicate whether it can actually be trusted
not to break the base system in one’s particular situation. If enough people test enough
packages in enough situations, contributed packages would become possible to reliably
deploy.
7.2. Applying semigroup theory
The model in this paper is one aspect of a more comprehensive study already in
progress.
The algebraic theory of computation [3,29] utilizes the theory of semigroups [30,35,
41] to better understand the nature of simple computations. Computations are abstracted as
state machines, where each machine is associated with a free semigroup of its input strings.
By considering inputs that produce the same output to be equivalent, the set of equivalence
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classes of sequences of operations forms a factor semigroup that completely describes the
behavior of the state machine. One fundamental theorem of the algebraic theory is that one
can algebraically decompose this semigroup into products of simpler factor semigroups
exactly when the state machine can be similarly decomposed into products of simpler
machines.
We were motivated to study and relate this theory to configuration management by the
relationships that we discovered between semigroup theory and the nature of convergence
in configuration management tools [23]. Convergent agents utilize operations with the
algebraic property of idempotence, in which any operation, repeated twice, has the same
effect as doing it once. Sets of idempotent operations have particularly nice algebraic
properties, including limiting the number of possible behaviors in response to a sequence
of operations.
Our long-term goal is to utilize this existing algebraic theory to describe and study
configuration management as a process. In configuration management, the state machine
is the network being configured. The inputs are configuration actions (or changes) and
the outputs are observed behaviors. Two inputs (actions) are equivalent if they produce
the same behavior (output). The sets of equivalence classes of sequences of operations
form a semigroup whose structure reflects the behavior of the machines being configured.
If the underlying machine is deterministic, the algebraic theory applies to configuration
management, and we can understand the machine being configured by understanding the
structure of configuration actions. In particular, subsystems of a machine are independent
whenever the semigroup of configuration operations can be factored into a product
semigroup, where each component of the product is a sub-semigroup of the original.
Likewise, lack of this factor structure indicates dependence between subsystems.
The practical effect of representing systems via configuration actions is to reduce the
complexity of what the human administrator has to understand in order to control a system.
While the systems to be configured are complex, they are comprised of sub-machines
with relatively simple and straightforward configuration operations and behaviors [21,51].
Describing these systems via configuration actions and their effects upon behavior—rather
than describing the internal semantics of the system—expresses a complex and opaque
thing (the actual system) in terms of things that are easier to express, understand, and
verify (the configuration actions and behaviors). This is the intent of the documentation
upon which every system administrator relies; our model simply formalizes its role.
7.3. Conclusions
This is a long and complex argument that develops a formal set of concepts for
discussing reproducibility in configuration management. Configuration management tools
have long sought to express some kind of observed population reproducibility. The first
step—of assuring observed local reproducibility—is relatively easy; it is a syntactic limit
upon the configuration operations that can even be checked by static analysis in a program
compiler. The second step—of assuring population reproducibility—requires a clever
rethinking of the structure of configuration management tools, in which testing becomes
an intrinsic part of the act of configuration. This testing—seemingly intractable at first
glance—becomes tractable if one employs an incremental process focused upon insuring
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correct behavior for a small number of sequences of configuration operations. This is
exactly how humans make the process tractable, and automatic tools can mimic that
practice.
This is a preliminary study and many issues have been left unaddressed. Most
important, our model utilizes discrete time steps in which the only actions on the system
are configuration operations. It does not model state changes due to usage and—more
important—due to unauthorized intrusions. Incorporating intrusion detection into the
model will be difficult, because intrusions—by nature—violate our concept of observed
reproducibility. If we know that a subsystem is a closed world, we can detect intrusions
as violations of observed reproducibility, while if we are unsure whether a subsystem is
closed, intrusions may easily pass for normal operation.
This paper is a first step in a long process. If we are to achieve the next level of computer
reliability, configuration management must become a science, with immutable laws that
assure correct behavior. This paper is at best a first step toward that absolutely necessary
goal.
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